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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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9 results foundAuthor: Mannava, Priya Title: Dependent on Development: The Interrelationships Between Illicit Drugs and Socioeconomic Development Summary: In spite of the complex interrelationships between illicit drug production, trade and use and socioeconomic development (SED), drug control and development policies tend to occur in isolation of each other, as exemplified by the lack of inclusion of illicit drugs in the Millennium Development Goals. A failure to acknowledge the interconnections between these two areas hinders the effectiveness of both drug and development policies and also undermines a human rights based approach to both illicit drug policy and development policies and programs. 1.1 Aims of the report This report highlights the multifaceted relationships between illicit drug production, trade and use, and SED, and then demonstrates the ways in which the implementation of illicit drug control policies often hinders development sector gains; and furthermore, the ways in which many development sector policies actually increase vulnerability to illicit drug production, trade and use. By raising awareness on the links between drugs, drug policy, and SED, this paper aims to facilitate future research as well as initiate dialogue and collaboration between development and drug control agencies. 1.2 Approach & Terminology The report is based on the hypothesis that ‘Equitable SED is necessary for successful control of illicit drugs, while effective and human rights based illicit drug control is required to foster sustainable SED’. To test this hypothesis, we begin by examining the impact of SED on illicit drug production, trade, and consumption, and then conversely the affect of the three processes on SED. In so doing, we consider ‘illicit drug production/trade/consumption’ and ‘SED’ as independent variables, and expect that outcomes will hold true for diverse settings at various times and for different drugs. We also note that we are exploring associations rather than causality, expecting that there will be limited, and largely anecdotal, evidence available – at least these early formative research stages. Here, we define ‘socioeconomic development’ as the processes of social and economic development in a society, whereby the ‘socio-’ in socioeconomic development consists of “social change designed to promote the well-being of a population as a whole” (Midgley 2005) while the ‘economic’ refers to “qualitative change and restructuring in a country’s economy in connection with technological and social progress” (World Bank definition). ‘Control’ is referred to here as the processes undertaken in order to minimize the harms associated with the availability and use of drugs in a community at a given point of time. In line with the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, ‘illicit drugs’ are defined as drugs produced, traded, and consumed for purposes prohibited by law, as outlined by the international drug control conventions. 1.3 Methods We conducted a review of formal and non-formal English language literature published between 1990 and 2010 on the relationships between illicit drug production, trade, and consumption, illicit drug policies, SED, and human rights. 2. Sizing the problem: illicit drugs – an overview 2.1 The need to control Policies and programs that aim to control or eradicate illicit drugs have been justified by the real and potential harms associated with illicit drugs: health problems, crime, decreased productivity, unemployment, and poverty. An international drug control system, based on three international conventions, specifies the types of illicit drugs and how these should be regulated. Despite control efforts, supply and demand of illicit drugs continue to be widespread. 2.2 The extent of illicit drug use, production, and trading. Noting the difficulties in measuring indicators related to illicit drugs, it is estimated that around 3.5% to 5.7% of the world’s populations aged between 15 to 64 years (155 to 250 million) consumes illicit drugs. Consumption continues to be higher in the wealthier regions of North America, Western Europe, and Oceania, though sharp rises in use are being witnessed in East and West Africa, the Middle East, and South America. Production of opium, which increased by 80% between 1998 and 2009, is highest in Afghanistan, which accounted for 60% of the world’s supply during the same period. Supply of cocaine, largely produced in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, was reported to have increased during the period of 2004 to 2007 as compared to earlier years, though the increase was not as dramatic as that of opium. Production of cannabis, the most widely produced illicit drug globally, and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) is prevalent in countries world-over. The illicit drug trade is also widespread, though data on seizures suggest the problem is more acute in those surrounding nations where illicit drug production or consumption is high. 2.3 Understanding demand and supply Demand and supply of illicit drugs are influenced by many interrelated and complex factors. Various intrapersonal, micro-environmental, and macro-environmental elements create vulnerabilities to the use of illicit drugs, while the employment opportunities and profits arising from illicit drug production and trading act as incentives to supply. There are thus broader socioeconomic issues which impact on engagement with illicit drug economies. 3. The interrelationships between socioeconomic development and illicit drugs 3.1 Impact of socioeconomic development on illicit drugs Both poor SED and enhanced SED can fuel illicit drug production, trade and consumption. Rural underdevelopment, conflict and economic crises are all factors that contribute to farming of illicit drug crops. Characteristics of plant-based illicit drugs mean that these crops are often a more viable option than licit ones in settings of poor SED. In countries ranging from Afghanistan to Colombia, to Morocco and Myanmar, evidence suggests that regions cultivating illicit drug crops are geographically and/or socially isolated, underdeveloped with few economic opportunities, and may also be plagued by violent conflict. Conflict, and the resultant instability, not only helps to facilitate and proliferate illicit drug economies, but in turn, often sustains the conflict – creating a mutually reinforcing cycle. In countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, and Myanmar, rebel and pro-government forces have used illicit drug economies to finance their activities. Conditions which contribute to weak SED such as unemployment, poverty, and marginalization may also create vulnerable environments for illicit drug use in both wealthy and less developed countries. For example, in the United States and United Kingdom, illicit drug use has been linked to socially and economically deprived urban settings. Similarly, studies in various countries of South America found that drug users were generally poorer, unemployed, and less educated. On the flip side, processes such as trade liberalization may in fact facilitate the flow of illicit drugs across borders. Though the type of association that exists between free trade and illicit drugs is yet to be understood, a modeling study suggests that in consuming countries, efforts to control trading may be hindered by free-trade policies. Modernization and the resultant change in values or norms that often accompanies SED may also lead to increased consumption of illicit drugs. In Indonesia and Pakistan, for instance, illicit drug use increased with newfound wealth and youth identifying themselves with images of Western popular culture. Within the socially marginalized Akha tribe in Laos, consumption of heroin and ATS increased following participation in the country’s market economy and in parallel with the country’s opium eradication program. 3.2. Impact of illicit drugs on socioeconomic development Simultaneously, illicit drug production, trade and consumption also affect SED. In the short-term, farmers and other members of impoverished communities benefit from illicit drug production and trade due to increased disposable income. At the national level, there may be a boost in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), reduced unemployment, and multiplier effects in other sectors, either due to increased expenditure in local markets or increased demand for production inputs of illicit drugs. For instance, a study dating back to the early 1990s found that a 10% increase in cocaine production in Bolivia resulted in a 2% increase in GDP and 6% decrease in unemployment. In Colombia, multiplier effects arising from the illicit drug economy helped to fuel growth in the property market. However, most of these short-term benefits are offset by the myriad of long-term adverse affects triggered by illicit drug economies. Firstly, the sheer volumes of money flowing from illicit drug economies help to encourage corruption. In several settings, there are reports of government and law enforcement officials turning a blind eye to illicit drugs in exchange for bribes. Secondly, social structures are disrupted as carers, such as single mothers or the income earner of the family, engage in risky trading of illicit drugs. As members of communities who participate in drug economies become richer, tensions in traditional power dynamics are created, thereby disrupting social harmony. Macroeconomic instability may also occur as a result of decreased investment in licit sectors, strengthening of the real exchange rate, and weakened effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies. The evidence to support these findings, however, is more limited. Violence and conflict between drug gangs, as well as between gangs and members of law enforcement, causes substantial mortality and morbidity while also isolating communities. In Mexico for example, drug-related killings have reached 28,000 over the past four years. In the United States, homicide rates have fluctuated in tandem with crack cocaine markets in cities where consumption is high and market sizes are substantial. There are considerable health costs associated with illicit drug use; for example, injecting drug use accounts for 10% of all HIV infections worldwide, and 30% outside sub-Saharan Africa. Drug users are also likely to be less productive; a study by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 5 different countries found that occupational injuries were 2-4 times higher and absenteeism 2-3 times greater amongst drug users as compared to non-drug users. The relationships between illicit drug economies and SED are thus two-way and simultaneous. Causality is more difficult to determine given that illicit drug economies and factors that contribute to SED can interact in a mutually reinforcing cycle. Corruption, violence and conflict can for example facilitate illicit drug production, trade and consumption, which in turn can sustain corruption, violence and conflict. 4. Paradox on paradox: effects of illicit drug control policy on socioeconomic development International and national illicit drug control policies have traditionally focused on reducing demand and supply of illicit drugs. Policies that focus on minimizing the harms associated with drug use are increasingly being adopted by many nation states. Supply side policies comprise traditional law enforcement approaches, including attempts to eradicate illicit drug cultivation and production; this latter approach sometimes accompanied by ‘alternative development’ programs that focus on providing other economic opportunities to communities that farm illicit drugs. To date, evidence suggests that these policies have been largely ineffective in deterring cultivation of illicit drug crops, as supply of various drugs has either been maintained or increased. In response to eradication programs in Colombia and Mexico, for instance, farmers simply shifted to farming opium on smaller and more dispersed fields. These policies have largely been unsuccessful in part because of the weak acknowledgement of the fact that illicit drugs and associated harms are often a result of a broader range of political, cultural and socioeconomic factors. By adopting approaches that are guided by narrowly defined goals and are not based on the political, social or cultural realties of a particular development context, law enforcement and eradication attempts actually cause further, multiple, harms and thereby weaken SED in communities. Examples from coca-producing Andean countries, as well as from Afghanistan and Myanmar where opium poppy cultivation is widespread, show how law enforcement and eradication programs actually wipe out the livelihoods of poor farmers social and economically disadvantaged communities. With few viable economic opportunities available, these households often resort again to farming of illicit drugs, simply from survival necessity. Successful alternative development programs are rare, although in Thailand a long-term (highly subsidized) approach has met with some success. Interdiction – programs aimed at reducing or stopping trading – has contributed to a diversification of smuggling routes, often to countries where law enforcement is weak. For example, the low-income country of Guinea Bissau has become a new trading corridor for drugs being smuggled to Europe. Ironically, a systematic review that found a positive correlation existed between increased law enforcement and increases in violence and crime. This is explained in part by the fact that law enforcement activities can create a riskier environment in which illicit drug trading and dealing occurs, making the situation more volatile and prone to drug gang power dynamics when members or leaders are arrested. There is even less evidence available on the impacts of demand side policies, which include primary prevention of drug use (mass media campaigns, community based programs, and education), treatment (secondary prevention), and law enforcement. While studies on the effectiveness of treatment for drug users have found that it helps reduce crime and risky injecting behavior, stringent law enforcement practices directed against drug users have only served to increase risky behavior, shift patterns in drug use, and deter health seeking. Studies examining the impact of law enforcement on drug use in Vancouver and Sydney found that drug use did not decrease, but riskier forms of use did. Following a ‘war on drugs’ campaign in Thailand, drug users reported increased reluctance to seek healthcare. Thus, social and economic costs to society are only sustained or even intensified, and are therefore likely to negatively impact SED. Harm reduction (policies and programs aimed at reducing harms associated with drug use) encompasses many components in immediate impact, harm reduction as currently defined is cost effective and has positive impacts on social development. There is a need for harm reduction approaches to be further developed and integrated, and be more broadly defined so they can have more impact across the range of drug issues. Studies suggest that benefits include: reduced risky drug use behavior, decreased transmission of HIV, safer disposal of injecting equipment, and less public nuisance. These findings indicate that social and health costs to societies may thus be reduced, thereby helping to enhance SED. 5. The forgotten victim: human rights Not only do some illicit drug policies have potential negative impacts on SED, but they also lead to violation of human rights. Eliminating families’ main source of income without creating viable alternatives robs them of their livelihood and dignity. Harsh law enforcement and militaristic approaches to controlling supply and demand of illicit drugs have had serious human rights implications, with physical abuse, sexual assault, public humiliation, denial of legal representation, and mortality being reported in the name of law enforcement. Moreover, in many countries, drug users are forced to undergo ‘treatment’ which is not evidenced-based. Stringent drug laws have often been used as an excuse to discriminate against poor and marginalized groups of society, especially ethnic minorities. Worldwide, drug users continue to be discriminated against, and are denied treatment and other social rights on the basis of their consumption of drugs. 6. Conclusions The interrelationships between illicit drug economies and SED are real and complex. Factors linked to SED may lead to or deter engagement with illicit drugs, while illicit drug economies negatively impact on SED in the long-term, despite possible shortterm benefits. By not acknowledging these linkages, illicit drug policies which focus solely on reducing demand and supply through law enforcement or forceful measures have often had consequences that adversely impact on SED, and also violate human rights – causing more harm than the drugs themselves. Thus, our original hypothesis that illicit drug policies are development policies are interdependent holds true based on the evidence available. The limitations of our review must be recognized. Our findings are based on limited evidence, which includes very few quantitative and detailed studies on the interrelationships, as well as a lack of rigorous evaluations of drug control programs. Our expectation of limited data availability was therefore also validated. In addition, there are inherent issues with determining impact of and on SED, and in this study we have assumed impact based on anecdotal and qualitative information rather than modeling or quantitative analyses. Having said this, our review substantiates the need for greater collaboration between illicit drug control and development agencies. It is imperative for development agencies and governments of developing and transitional countries to investigate and account for the impact of development on vulnerabilities to drug production, trade, and use. All aspects of development, ranging from infrastructure projects to education programs, especially if donor funded, must consider implications for illicit drug production, trade, and use, as is currently done with respect to poverty, the environment or gender dynamics. At the same time, current illicit drug policies need review in light of their inequitable and damaging effects in relation to social development. While acknowledgement of the link between both fields has been increasing, further research in the area will help to provide a stronger base for advocacy to ensure that theory is translated into practice. Details: Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2011 at: http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Dependent-on-Development.pdf Year: 0 Country: International URL: http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Dependent-on-Development.pdf Shelf Number: 121880 Keywords: Drug Control PoliciesDrug EnforcementDrug TradeDrug TraffickingDrugs Abuse and AddictionEconomics and CrimeGangsPovertySocioeconomic Development |
Author: Fishstein, Paul Title: Evolving Terrain: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2013 Summary: It is generally assumed that there will be significant increases in the level of opium poppy cultivation after the critical year 2014, when international military combat forces will withdraw and Afghanistan will select its next president. In 2012-13, at the national level, area cultivated increased for the third consecutive year, and total opium production rose significantly. With 410 hectares (ha) of opium poppy recorded in the province, for the first time since 2007 Balkh is no longer classified as "poppy-free," while Badakhshan saw an increase of 23 percent in area cultivated, despite reported eradication of the largest area of any province. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2014 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Balkh%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Balkh%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study.pdf Shelf Number: 132136 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug TradeNarcoticsOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Wyler, Liana Sun Title: International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses Summary: The global illegal drug trade represents a multi-dimensional challenge that has implications for U.S. national interests as well as the international community. Common illegal drugs trafficked internationally include cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. According to the U.S. intelligence community, international drug trafficking can undermine political and regional stability and bolster the role and capabilities of transnational criminal organizations in the drug trade. Key regions of concern include Latin America and Afghanistan, which are focal points in U.S. efforts to combat the production and transit of cocaine and heroin, respectively. Drug use and addiction have the potential to negatively affect the social fabric of communities, hinder economic development, and place an additional burden on national public health infrastructures. International efforts to combat drug trafficking are based on a long-standing and robust set of multilateral commitments, to which the United States adheres. U.S. involvement in international drug control rests on the central premise that helping foreign governments combat the illegal drug trade abroad will ultimately curb illegal drug availability and use in the United States. To this end, the current Administration maintains the goal of reducing and eliminating the international flow of illegal drugs into the United States through international cooperation to disrupt the drug trade and interdiction efforts. Despite long-standing multilateral commitments to curb the supply of illicit drugs, tensions appear at times between U.S. foreign drug policy and approaches advocated by independent observers and other members of the international community. In recent years, an increasing number of international advocates, including several former and sitting heads of state, have begun to call for a reevaluation of current prohibitionist-oriented international drug policies. Alternatives to the existing international drug control regime may include legalizing or decriminalizing certain drugs. Debates may also focus on shifting priorities and resources among various approaches to counternarcotics, including supply and demand reduction; the distribution of domestic and international drug control funding; and the relative balance of civilian, law enforcement, and military roles in anti-drug efforts. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: RL34543: Accessed August 28, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34543.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34543.pdf Shelf Number: 129902 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Enforcement Drug TradeDrug Trafficking |
Author: Goodman, Mary Beth Title: To Stem the Flow of Illicit Drugs from Afghanistan, Follow the Money Summary: Corruption poses an existential challenge to Afghanistan's stability, as well as its political and economic development. Under the leadership of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, there is an opportunity for the United States to capitalize on the newly expressed political will of Afghanistan's elected leaders to curb corruption. Afghanistan's national unity government has prioritized the fight against the epidemic of graft plaguing the country, and this fight is intricately tied to the production and flow of drugs. Although the United States has invested $8 billion-as of December 30, 2014-in counternarcotics efforts, Afghanistan still leads the world in opium production, and its farmers are growing more opium than ever before. The sale of opium and cannabis - another drug of which Afghanistan is a leading cultivator on the international market - produces huge sums of cash that must be laundered, or made clean, so it can appear legitimate. This parallel market and the illicit financial transactions that sustain it have a debilitating impact on the rule of law in Afghanistan; undermine the legitimacy of government institutions; and ultimately impede the ability of the Afghan government to provide basic services to its citizens. Because no bank outside of Afghanistan denominates in the Afghani-the country's national currency-the state's drug trade runs on the flow of international currencies such as U.S. dollars, euros, and British pounds. Moreover, the weak oversight of anti-money laundering controls coupled with the systemic corruption plaguing Afghan institutions serves to compound the narcotics conundrum. The Afghan drug trade poses an immediate and urgent threat to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and to the integrity of the Afghan state itself. Greater efforts must be made to stem the flow of money derived from the narcotics trade in order to significantly reduce Afghanistan's narcotics production and curb corruption. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2015. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 19, 2015 at: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AfghanistanNarcotics-brief.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AfghanistanNarcotics-brief.pdf Shelf Number: 134975 Keywords: Drug MarketsDrug TradeDrug TraffickingIllegal DrugsMoney LaunderingNarcotics (Afghanistan) |
Author: Fleetwood, Jennifer Title: Women in the international cocaine trade: Gender, choice and agency in context Summary: This thesis is about women in the international cocaine trade and in particular about their experiences as drug mules. This is the first comprehensive qualitative investigation based on the accounts of women and men who worked as drug mules and those who organise and manage trafficking cocaine by mule across international borders. Two explanations for women's involvement in drug trafficking compete. The 'feminisation of poverty' thesis contends that women's participation in the drug trade results from (and is a response to) their economic and social subordination. The 'emancipation thesis' contends that women's participation in the drugs trade is an effect of women's liberation. This thesis explores if and how women's involvement in the drug trafficking (recruitment and 'work') is shaped by their gender. I interviewed 37 men and women drug traffickers imprisoned in Quito, Ecuador. This location was chosen due to the high numbers of women and men imprisoned for drug trafficking crimes. Respondents came from all levels of the drug trade and from different parts of the world. Data was collected and analysed using narrative analysis to understand the way in which discourses of victimhood were created in prison. This allowed for a sensitive interpretation of the meaning of victimhood and agency in respondents' responses. The substantive section of the thesis examines two aspects of women's involvement in drug trafficking in depth. The first section examines aspects of women's recruitment into the drug trade as mules; the second section examines the work that mules do. This research finds that women's participation in the international cocaine trade cannot be adequately understood through the lens of either victimisation or volition. The contexts in which men and women chose to work as a mule were diverse reflecting their varied backgrounds (nationality, age, experience, employment status, as well as gender). Furthermore, mules' motivations reflected not only volition but also coercion and sometimes threat of violence. Although gender was a part of the context in which respondents became involved in mule-work, it was not the only, or the most important aspect. Secondly, this research examined the nature of mule-work. Most mules (men and women) willingly entered a verbal contract to work as a drugs mule; nonetheless the context of 'mule-work' is inherently restrictive. Mules were subject to surveillance and management by their 'contacts' had few opportunities to have control or choice over their work. Collaboration, resistance and threat were often played out according to gendered roles and relationships but gender was not a determining factor. Nonetheless, respondents could and did find ways to negotiate resist and take action in diverse and creative ways. Prior research on the cocaine trade has ignored the importance of women's participation or has considered it only in limited ways driven by gender stereotypes. Thus, this research addresses a significant gap in available evidence on women in the drug trade. This research also contributes to contemporary debates in theories of women's offending which have centred on the role of victimisation and agency in relation to women's offending. Details: Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2009. 272p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 5, 2016 at: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/9895/Fleetwood2009.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2009 Country: Ecuador URL: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/9895/Fleetwood2009.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138564 Keywords: Drug MulesDrug OffendersDrug TradeDrug TraffickingFemale Offenders |
Author: Global Witness Title: Lords of Jade: How Southeast Asia's biggest drug lord used shell companies to become a jade kingpin. Summary: Southeast Asia's most notorious narcotics trafficker has become one of the most powerful figures in the country's corrupt, abusive jade business, a new Global Witness report reveals today. Building on Global Witness' explosive recent reporting, Lords of Jade shows how Wei Hsueh Kang controls a range of companies licensed to exploit the Hpakant jade mines in conflict-affected Kachin State. Wei is the architect of a methamphetamine epidemic that has ripped through Southeast Asia, and is the subject of sanctions and a US$2 million bounty from the US government. His network is alleged by business insiders and observers to control Yadanar Yaung Chi, a company that was depositing waste at the tailings dump in Hpakant that collapsed on 21 November, killing over a hundred people. Companies controlled by Wei Hsueh Kang were originally given jade licences by Myanmar's military dictatorship following a ceasefire deal with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the best equipped of the country's ethnic armed groups, in which Wei has played a leadership role. The US authorities announced indictments and sanctions on Wei's jade business in 2005 and 2008, but it simply shed one corporate skin and grew another. As one analyst of drugs business told Global Witness, "It's a shell game, they just changed the shell". Wei's group have used their connections with the much-feared UWSA to deter scrutiny of their activities. Described by one jade business insider as "a gangster group doing black business", they operate a form of protection racket that exerts control over at least fifty jade mines. Many insiders consider them the most powerful players in Myanmar's staggeringly lucrative jade sector. In the words of one, "If you don't use the Wa name, you cannot operate in Hpakant". The firms at the core of this group collectively posted sales of over US$100 million in jade across two official gems sales events in 2013 and 2014 but are reported to have made far more through smuggling of jade into China. While many of Wei Hsueh Kang's international business connections are believed to be in China and Hong Kong, the front man for the jade companies he controls has a close relationship with American machinery giant Caterpillar Inc., which has invited him on promotional tours of several countries. This reflects both the extent of Wei Hsueh Kang's evasion of US sanctions and the risks that international investors face in Myanmar. In the case of Caterpillar, these risks have been exacerbated by the company's apparent failure to do adequate due diligence on the owners of its dealership in Myanmar. Wei Hsueh Kang's role is a stark reminder of the toxic state of the jade trade, but Myanmar's new government does have options to start addressing it. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global anti-corruption scheme which Myanmar joined in 2014, offers one entry point for tackling the opacity of the jade business, including the specific problem of hidden company ownership. It recommends that companies in the oil gas and mining industries be required to disclose their ultimate 'beneficial' owners and Global Witness is arguing that this provision be applied to jade and other extractive industries as soon as possible. Meanwhile, US sanctions on jade and key players in the business such as Wei Hsueh Kang offer a source of leverage which can be used constructively to reinforce and provide incentives for an agenda for cleaning up the sector. Details: London: Global Witness, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/lords-jade/ Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/lords-jade/ Shelf Number: 138578 Keywords: Drug TradeNatural ResourcesPrecious MetalsSmuggling |
Author: Becker, Sarah Title: The Effects of the Drug Cartels on Medellin and the Colombian State Summary: In 2012, Medellin was named "City of the Year" by the Urban Land Institute and became a universal model for a country's comeback from extreme violence. However, twenty years earlier at the height of the drug cartel's power, Medellin, the hub of the cocaine industry, was reported the most dangerous city in the world. The author posits the economic, political, social and physical effects of the cartels are and were profoundly felt by both marginalized and mainstream citizens who came into contact with the consequences of the cartel's actions on a daily basis. However, Medellin is altering its contemporary reputation to one of innovation, creativity, and equity. This paper examines the effects of the drug cartels and international cocaine trade on the Colombian Republic with a focus on Medellin, the nucleus of the industry. It will also address what has been done in Medellin's era of reconstruction to recover from a dark history and create a space free of violence, fear, and uncertainty. Details: Waltham, MA: Brandeis University, 2013. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://bir.brandeis.edu/bitstream/handle/10192/25053/BeckerThesis2013.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: https://bir.brandeis.edu/bitstream/handle/10192/25053/BeckerThesis2013.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 131367 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug TradeDrug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Organized Crime |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Fire and Ice: Conflict and Drugs in Myanmar's Shan State Summary: Myanmar's Shan State has emerged as one of the largest global centres for the production of crystal methamphetamine ("ice"). Large quantities of the drug, with a street value of tens of billions of dollars, are seized each year in Myanmar, neighbouring countries and across the Asia-Pacific. Production takes place in safe havens in Shan State held by militias and other paramilitary units allied with the Myanmar military, as well as in enclaves controlled by non-state armed groups. The trade in ice, along with amphetamine tablets and heroin, has become so large and profitable that it dwarfs the formal economy of Shan State, lies at the heart of its political economy, fuels criminality and corruption and hinders efforts to end the state's long-running ethnic conflicts. Myanmar's government should stop prosecuting users and small-scale sellers and work with its neighbours to disrupt the major networks and groups profiting from the trade. The military should better constrain pro-government militias and paramilitaries involved in the drugs trade, with an eye to their eventual demobilisation. The growing drugs trade in Shan State is in part a legacy of the area's ethnic conflicts. For decades, the Myanmar military has struck ceasefire deals with armed groups and established pro-government militias. Such groups act semi-autonomously and enjoy considerable leeway to pursue criminal activities. Indeed, conditions in parts of Shan State are ideal for large-scale drug production, which requires a kind of predictable insecurity: production facilities can be hidden from law enforcement and other prying eyes but insulated from disruptive violence. Tackling the drug trade presents a complex policy challenge involving security, law enforcement, political and public health aspects. But if the drugs trade is partly a symptom of Shan State's conflicts, it is also an obstacle to sustainably ending them. The trade, which now dwarfs legitimate business activities, creates a political economy inimical to peace and security. It generates revenue for armed groups of all stripes. Militias and other armed actors that control areas of production and trafficking routes have a disincentive to demobilise, given that weapons, territorial control and the absence of state institutions are essential to those revenues. The trade attracts transnational criminal groups and requires bribing officials for protection, support or to turn a blind eye, which allows a culture of payoffs and graft to flourish and adds to the grievances of ethnic minority communities that underpin the seventy-year old civil war. Myanmar's military, which has ultimate authority over militias and paramilitaries and profits from their activities, can only justify the existence of such groups in the context of the broader ethnic conflict in the state - so the military also has less incentive to end that conflict. Tackling the drug trade presents a complex policy challenge involving security, law enforcement, political and public health aspects. An integrated approach that addresses all of these areas will be needed to effectively address it: - Myanmar's government should redouble its drug control efforts, ending prosecutions of small-time dealers and users and refocusing on organised crime and corruption associated with the trade. The president should instruct and empower the Anti-Corruption Commission to prioritise this. - At the community level, the government should focus more on education and harm reduction, in line with its February 2018 National Drug Control Policy. It should work with relevant donors and international agencies to invest in education and harm reduction initiatives geared specifically toward the particular dangers of crystal meth use. Although crystal meth is currently not widely used in Myanmar, that is likely to change given the huge scale of production. - Myanmar's military should rethink the conflict management approaches it has employed for decades. In particular, it should exert greater control over - and ultimately disarm and disband - allied militias and paramilitary forces that are among the key players in the drug business. The impunity that these groups enjoy, and the requirement that they mostly fund themselves, has pushed them to engage in lucrative illicit activities. - The military should also investigate and take concerted action to end drug-related corruption within its ranks, focusing on senior officers who facilitate or turn a blind eye to the trade. - Myanmar's neighbours should stop illicit flows of precursors, the chemicals used to manufacture drugs, into Shan State. As the main source of such chemicals, China has a particular responsibility to end this trade taking place illegally across its south-western border. It should also use its influence over the Wa and Mongla armed groups controlling enclaves on the Chinese border to end their involvement in the drug trade and other criminal activities. Targeting the major players in the drug trade will not be easy and comes with risks of pushback, perhaps violent, from those involved. But the alternative - allowing parts of Shan State to continue to be a safe haven for this large-scale criminal enterprise - will see closer links between local armed actors, corrupt officials in Myanmar and the region, and transnational criminal organisations. The more such a system becomes entrenched, and the greater the profits it generates, the harder it will be to dislodge and the longer conflicts in that area are likely to persist. The people of Shan State, and Myanmar as a whole, will pay the highest price. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2019. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2019 at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/299-fire-and-ice-conflict-and-drugs-myanmars-shan-state Year: 2019 Country: Asia URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/299-fire-and-ice.pdf Shelf Number: 154750 Keywords: CorruptionCrystal MethDrug DealingDrug TradeDrug TraffickingIceMethamphetamineMyanmarShan State |
Author: Magliocca, Nicholas R. Title: Modeling Cocaine Traffickers and Counterdrug Interdiction Forces as a Complex Adaptive System Summary: Abstract: Counterdrug interdiction efforts designed to seize or disrupt cocaine shipments between South American source zones and US markets remain a core US "supply side" drug policy and national security strategy. However, despite a long history of US-led interdiction efforts in the Western Hemisphere, cocaine movements to the United States through Central America, or "narco-trafficking," continue to rise. Here, we developed a spatially explicit agent-based model (ABM), called "NarcoLogic," of narco-trafficker operational decision making in response to interdiction forces to investigate the root causes of interdiction ineffectiveness across space and time. The central premise tested was that spatial proliferation and resiliency of narco-trafficking are not a consequence of ineffective interdiction, but rather part and natural consequence of interdiction itself. Model development relied on multiple theoretical perspectives, empirical studies, media reports, and the authors' own years of field research in the region. Parameterization and validation used the best available, authoritative data source for illicit cocaine flows. Despite inherently biased, unreliable, and/or incomplete data of a clandestine phenomenon, the model compellingly reproduced the "cat-and-mouse" dynamic between narco-traffickers and interdiction forces others have qualitatively described. The model produced qualitatively accurate and quantitatively realistic spatial and temporal patterns of cocaine trafficking in response to interdiction events. The NarcoLogic model offers a much-needed, evidence-based tool for the robust assessment of different drug policy scenarios, and their likely impact on trafficker behavior and the many collateral damages associated with the militarized war on drugs. Details: S.L.: Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences of the United States of America, 2018. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 27, 2019 at: https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/116/16/7784.full.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.pnas.org/content/116/16/7784 Shelf Number: 157047 Keywords: CocaineDrug TradeDrug TraffickersDrug TraffickingIllegal TradeIllicit TradeNarcoticsWar on Drugs |